DEFINITIONS A. Public Projects
We are concerned with the realization of a package of public projects in an economy with a unique private good (which can be thought of as money) and N agents. The only restriction imposed in the analysis on the public projects is that the set of available public project packages be a compact set X in a topological space. Examples include: (i) a fixed-size unique public project; then YC = (0, 1) where 1 represents the realization of the project and 0 the nonrealization; (ii) a variable-size unique public project; then the allowable size should belong to a Let K be an element of YC.
B. Transfers, Utility Functions, and Valuation Functions
Simultaneously with public goods, we consider monetary transfers ti, i = 1, . . .,N, so that starting from an initial position the gain in utility of agent i due to a program of public projects and transfers is: ui(K, ti) defined on X x R.
DEFINITION 1: The utility function ui is said to be (additively) separable iff ui (K, ti) = vi (K) +ti.
The function vi( ), which is considered net of the imputed costs (defined ex ante) of the project, is referred to as the valuation function of agent i. The assumption of separability amounts to absence of income effect in the evaluation of public goods.
The paper, with the exception of the appendix, is concerned only with separable utility functions; most definitions apply to this case with trivial generalizations for the general case.
C . Mechanisms
In order to solve the free rider problem we subject the N agents to a game which is played according to the following rules (or mechanisms):
Let Si, i = 1, . . . ,N, be the strategy space of agent i, and let S = IIElSi.A play of the game is an element s = (sl, . . . ,sN)E S. The game can be played with different levels of information concerning the actions of the other players. If the actions of the other players are known, the outcome of the game may be a Nash equilibrium. If they are unknown, the agents may play a maximin strategy or maximize 'their expected utility with given subjective probability distributions over the actions of the others. In all the games considered in this paper, the optimal strategy is a dominant strategy (i.e., is optimal for any action of the other players); in this case, all these behavioral postulates regarding the players in the game are equivalent.
We introduce now several sets of rules of the game. DEFINITION 2: A mechanism, M = (S, f), is a set of strategy spaces Si, i = 1,.. . , N , and a function f ( . ) = [ d ( . ) , t l ( . ) , . . . , t N ( . ) ] from l l E l~i =~ into x x R~ such that for a play s: (i) the accepted project is d(s), and (ii) the transfer to agent i is ti(s) for i = 1 , . . . ,N.
DEFINITION 3: A revelation mechanism, R M = {V,f},is a mechanism for which a strategy is a valuation function of the public project and a strategy space Si = v,' is a space of allowable valuation functions.
In a revelation mechanism, the question to the agent is: what is your valuation function? Clearly, such a mechanism can be used only if agents have separable utility functions. Only then is it meaningful to ask for the evaluation of a public project independently of the specification of the transfer. We denote by wi( . ) the answered valuation function which may be different from the true one vi( . ). Let w ( ' ) = [ w l ( ' ) , . . . , w N ( ' ) 1 .
The selection of d(w( . )) made in the set of projects which maximize the sum of valuation functions is arbitrary; it will be also denoted by K*(w(. )). A necessary condition to use such a mechanism is that the set of maximizing projects be non-empty. Since YC is a compact set, a sufficient condition is that the valuation functions be restricted to be upper semi-continuous (u.s.c.) on EC. duced independently one element of this family for which hi(w-;( . )) = -ZW-~(KT*(W-;( .))) where KT* maximizes Z W -~( .). Vickrey [7] gave a similar mechanism for the case of private goods to avoid speculative behavior. DEFINITION 9: A revelation mechanism is strongly individually incentive cornpatible (s.i.i.c.), if the truth is a dominant strategy for each individual, i.e.,
In the sequel, if we have in YC the no-action program denoted as 0, by definition, ui(0)= 0, i = 1, . .. , N. In a revelation mechanism for which 0 E YC, we say that a strategy wi( ) is normalized if wi(0) = 0. If all the strategies are normalized, the revelation mechanism is said to be normalized.
CHARACTERIZATION OF SATISFACTORY MECHANISMS
In a world of separable utility functions, we show first that all the s.i.i.c. successful revelation mechanisms are Groves mechanisms and, then, that all the satisfactory mechanisms are isomorphic to (extended) Groves mechanisms.
THEOREM 1(Groves and Loeb [5] ): A Groves mechanism is s.i.i.c.
PROOF: For any w -~( ) E V-i and any wi
Q.E.D.
THEOREM 2 (Groves[4]):
The set ofdominant strategies for a Groves mechanism is {vi( .) + a i ) where a, i = 1,. . . ,N, are arbitrary constants. There is a unique normalized dominant strategy corresponding to ai= 0, i = 1, . . . ,N.
PROOF: Suppose that there exists a dominant strategy, say vl( .), which is not of the form vi( ) +ai.Then, there exist E >0, a, K* E YC, and K** E YC such that:
Choose w+( ) u.s.c. such that:
and There is a unique normalized dominant strategy corresponding to ai = 0, i = 1, . . . ,N.
PROOF: AS in Theorem 2, we show first that a dominant strategy for agent i must be of the form {vi( ) +ai}. vi ( ) is a dominant strategy since the mechanism is s.i.i.c. As in Theorem 2, it is also the only normalized dominant strategy.
Q.E.D.
DEFINITION 10:A direct revelation mechanism satisfies Property A, if and only
LEMMA 1: A direct revelation mechanism is a Groves mechanism if and only if it satisfies Property A.
PROOF: Obvious.
We are now able to prove the main characterization theorem.
THEOREM 3: A s.i.i.c. direct revelation mechanism is a Groves mechanism.
PROOF: We consider in turn the negation of the two parts of Property A. If (i) fails there exist wPi( ), wi( .), and wl( .) which lead to the same K* such that $:(K*) = -ZW_~(K*), and (iii) Gi(K*') = -XW_~(K*') +8.
4The public project under consideration is part of the larger economic system. If individuals recognize this, they may also evaluate various levels of the public project in the light of their predictions about equilibrium prices that would arise in these cases. It is known that the set of equilibria behaves only upper semi-continuously as the parameters are varied; and in this case we can treat the social decision about the public projects as a parameter of the private goods equilibrium. Due to potential discontinuities in the set of equilibria, we may expect corresponding discontinuities in willingnesses to pay for marginal units of the project, even if there are no income effects on the demand for the project itself.
Let q >0 be such that q <IK* -K*'J and
By construction Gl( .) is continuous since wi( .), j # i, are continuous and satisfy
(ii)and (iii). Moreover, it is easy to see that (i) is also satisfied since we always have
Q.E. D.
THEOREM 4: A successful s.i.i.c. normalized revelation mechanism is a normalized Groves mechanism.
PROOF: Since the revelation mechanism is s.i.i.c. and normalized, agents will answer their true valuation function vi( ), i = 1,.. . ,N, by Corollary 2. Since it is successful, we can say that the decision is taken by maximizing the sum of the answers. Therefore it is a direct revelation mechanism. Hence, the result by Theorem 3.
We now extend the characterization to satisfactory mechanisms. . ' g~' (~l ) , 9~ gz1(sN)1 =f(s).
Q.E.D.
If the assumption of uniqueness in Theorem 5 is left out, it is only possible to obtain a weaker characterization. Indeed, consider the following example.
Let YC = (0, l);Si =R 2, si = (sil, si2), i = 1, . . .,N, and define the mechanism as follows:
Then, the set of dominant strategies is: Therefore, this mechanism cannot be expressed as g[$(s)] for any Groves mechanism since ti( s ) ,i = 1, . . . ,N are not constant over TIE19i (vi( .)).
However, all satisfactory mechanisms can be shown to be isomorphic to extended Groves mechanisms. PROOF: It is a matter of routine to check that Theorem 2, Theorem 3, and Theorem 4 are true for extended (direct) revelation mechanisms. The proof then follows the lines of the proof of Theorem 5 with some differences noted below. Now, Bi(vi(. )) is the set of dominant strategies of agent i when the truth is vi( ), i = 1, . . . ,N. We construct an extended normalized revelation mechanism as follows. Let K be the set of normalized u.s.c. valuation functions and let @ is now a correspondence with two properties: s 1E 9 ( v ( )) and s2E 9 ( v ( . )) implies that both d ( s l ) and d(s2)maximize Xui(. ), otherwise the mechanisms would not be successful.
Also, vi(d(sl))+ z ( s l ) = vi(d(s2))+ T , ( s~) .
Otherwise there would exist ti( ) E z(.) such that, without loss of generality:
and then s? would not bk a dominant strategy for agent i. 
APPENDIX
We show the non-existence of successful s.i.i.c. direct revelation mechanisms for the fixed-size unique public project case when preferences are not separable. Now, in defining normalized revelation mechanisms, the question is: What is your utility function normalized in such a way that the utility of "no project and transfer t" equals the transfer t. For a separable utility function we had:
An example of a nonseparable normalized utility function is:
For the separable case, the evaluation of the project is a constant; it is a function of the transfer for the nonseparable case. Finally, when utility functions are nonseparable, we must change slightly the notions of successfulness and incentive compatibility. We say that a D R M is successful if for any transfer program PROOF: Whenever the project is accepted t2>x by successfulness. Then, there would be an incentive to set x high to force a high t, (since u,(l, tZ) is increasing in t,), contradicting s.i.i.c.
Q.E.D.

LEMMA 2: It is not true that the project is rejected for all x.
PROOF: If SO, the transfer to Agent 2 would be given by a function t p ( x ) which would be everywhere belowx. Clearly, no constant function has this property. Letx' andx" be such that t2(x1) <t2(x1'); then if the true tastes are at x', the individual has an incentive to use x" instead (since uz (O, t,) is increasing in  tz) .
Let X be the set of x that lead to acceptance and X ' be the complement of that set.
LEMMA3: The transfers to Individual 2 must be constant on X and X' PROOF: If not (say on X), then if the true x o e X were associated with a lower transfer than some other x l E X, the statement xl would be better than xo since the transfer would be higher and, since uz(l, t2) is increasing in tz, contradicting s.i.i.c.
In the case of X ' the same argument holds. Q.E.D.
Take x E X and X ' E X'.
PROOF: First, let us compare the transfer with the statement (a, b, x) to the transfer with the constant statement e, such that e 3-c. These transfers must be equal for, if they were higher at (a, b, x), then (a, b, x) would be answered instead of e when e was true, and vice versa (since u2(1, t2) is increasing).
By a similar argument, we note that the transfer at (a, b, x') must equal that at constant statements e' such that e'< -c.
Then, by Theorem 2 and Lemma 1 (Section 2), we know that transfer at e 3 -c is equal to that at e' <-c plus c.
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 7.
PROOFOF THEOREM7: By the above l e m~a t a , we know that there exists a number ;such that the tzansfer to Agent 2 throughout the region X is t + c a_nd the project is accepted, and throughout X ' it is t and the projectis rejected. Mo_reover, since c <0, t + c < t.Since the mechanism is successful, x E X implies that x t + c for if x > t +c, then the preferences at t +c would lead to rejection rather than acceptance. Likewise, X ' E X' implies x ' > t.
Therefore, letting f E (T+c,'i), we obtain a contradiction to either f E X or f E X', and hence we contradict the fact that the mechanism produces a well-defined outcome.
REMARK: It is clear from the above proof that the constancy of the evaluations on the sets {t/t 3x} and {t/t <x} is not necessary to obtain the counterexample. The crucial feature is that u2(l, t2) = tz+ u2(t2) is increasing in tz COROLLARY4: Under the conditions of Theorem 7, there exists no satisfactory mechanism.
PROOF: Note first that from an extended normalized revelation mechanism one can always select a normalized revelation mechanism. Suppose, then, that there exists a satisfactory mechanism. From the first part of Theorem 6 and the above remark, there exists a normalized successful s.i.i.c. revelation mechanism, a contradiction in view of Theorem 7.
